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The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCVII, No. 3 (July 1988) 
Brandt's Definition of "Good"' 
J. David Velleman 
R ichard Brandt has argued that the word "good" should be de- 
fined as meaning that a thing is rational to desire, in the 
sense that one would desire it after a process of "value-free ref lec- 
tion" that Brandt calls "cognitive psychotherapy."2 In cognitive 
psychotherapy, as prescribed by Brandt, the patient draws on "the 
propositions accepted by the science of [his] day, plus factual 
propositions justified by publicly accessible evidence . . . and the 
principles of logic" (p. 13); and he represents to himself, repeat- 
edly and vividly, every item of such information that stands to 
exert a specific effect on his desires-that is, an effect impinging 
only on particular desires and attributable to the content of the 
information represented (p. 112).3 The desires that one would 
have after such treatment are the ones that are rational for one to 
have, according to Brandt, and "good" should be defined as 
meaning "rational to desire" in this sense. 
Brandt's definition of "good" has a venerable history and, it ap- 
pears, a promising future. It is closely akin to definitions offered 
by Henry Sidgwick4 and Johns Rawls.5 Its account of rational de- 
'This paper is descended from a somewhat longer paper entitled 
"Should 'Good' Be Defined as 'Rationally Desired'?" which was descended, 
in turn, from a much longer paper entitled "Can Rationality Be the Foun- 
dation of Ethics?" For helpful comments on one or more of these papers, I 
am indebted to Paul Boghossian, Richard Brandt, Stephen Darwall, Allan 
Gibbard, Donald Herzog, Louis Loeb, Donald Morrison, Adrian Piper, 
Peter Railton, Richard Rorty, Nicholas White; and to anonymous readers 
for The Philosophical Review, who commented on several different versions. 
2A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press of 
Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 113. Hereinafter, all references to this 
work will be given parenthetically in the text. 
3In this sentence I am giving Brandt's definition of the phrase "all avail- 
able relevant information," which specifies what the patient must consider 
in cognitive psychotherapy. The first half of the sentence quotes Brandt's 
definition of available information, and the' second half paraphrases his 
definition of relevance. 
4The Methods of Ethics (London, England: MacMillan, 1907), pp. 
105-115. 
5A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 
pp. 407ff. 
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sire has been heartily endorsed by Richard Hare.6 And most re- 
cently, a similar definition has been deployed by Peter Railton 
under the banner of moral realism.7 
I have serious qualms about Brandt's definition and its kin. This 
paper expounds my qualms. 
THE STRATEGY OF REFORMING DEFINITIONS 
Brandt doesn't claim that his definition of "good" is what the 
layman has in mind when using the word. Rather, he claims that 
his definition is a revised version of the layman's meaning-a ver- 
sion from which confusions and irrelevancies have been elimi- 
nated. Thus, he says that "to ask whether an action is rational or a 
desire is rational is to capture everything important in the tradi- 
tional normative questions" (p. 14). Similarly, he says that his sense 
of the word "rational" "captures all that is clear" in ordinary talk 
about normative issues (p. 15). Or again, he says that "rationally 
desired" can be substituted for "good" in any sentence "which 
makes an identifiable point" (p. 127). Hence whatever is unimpor- 
tant, unclear, or unidentifiable in ordinary evaluative discourse is 
not meant to be preserved in Brandt's language of rational desire. 
Here too, Brandt follows Sidgwick, who presented his definition of 
"good" "as giving philosophical precision to the vaguer meaning 
with which [it is] used in ordinary discourse."8 
Brandt insists, however, that his reformed evaluative language 
will serve the same practical function that ordinary evaluative lan- 
guage currently serves. He believes that ascertaining what's good 
in his sense will still settle the practical questions of what to desire, 
what to choose, and what to pursue-as he illustrates in the fol- 
lowing example. 
A Harvard professor is offered a position in Los Angeles (as 
Brandt tells it) and is weighing the pros and cons of the offer. 
Brandt recommends that the professor ask himself whether he 
would prefer the new position after cognitive psychotherapy. As it 
turns out, the professor would already prefer the new position if 
6Moral Thinking; Its Levels, Method and Point (Oxford, England: Clar- 
endon Press of Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 101-105; 214-218. 
7"Moral Realism," The Philosophical Review 95 (1986), pp. 163-207, and 
"Facts and Values," Philosophical Topics 14 (1986), pp. 5-31. 
8Methods of Ethics, p. 112. 
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only he weren't "appalled by the thought of detaching himself 
from Harvard" (p. 125); and his aversion to leaving Harvard may 
well be the sort of attitude that cognitive psychotherapy would ex- 
tinguish. According to Brandt, "if he found that his basic reason 
for preferring to stay at Harvard is irrational, his practical 
problem would be resolved." Brandt thus claims that although his 
definition of "good" will slightly alter what our concept of good- 
ness is, it should not change what the concept does in guiding our 
attitudes and actions. 
But if we revise the content of our evaluative terms without al- 
tering their practical function, we shall in effect have changed our 
minds about how to conduct our practical affairs. Currently we 
strive to desire, choose, and pursue whatever is good in our ordi- 
nary sense of the term; whereas Brandt would have us strive to 
desire, choose, and pursue whatever is good in his sense. Hence 
Brandt's linguistic reforms are not just an exercise in semantics: 
they embody a substantive ethical proposal, a proposal about how 
to live. 
In defending this proposal Brandt takes two slightly different 
approaches. Sometimes he says that his terminology will enable us 
to ask the questions that we have really wanted to ask all along 
when seeking practical guidance. He thus suggests that in trying to 
desire, choose, or pursue what's good in the ordinary sense, we 
have misrepresented and hence disserved our own deepest aspira- 
tions, which will be better served by deliberation conducted in his 
reformed terminology. At other times, however, Brandt claims, 
not that his terminology articulates what we already want to know 
for practical purposes, but that it articulates what we should want 
to know-or, more precisely, what we shall want to know once we 
have reflected on the choice between his definitions and ours. 
Here Brandt concedes that desiring, choosing, and pursuing the 
good as ordinarily conceived is what we have aspired to until now; 
but he contends that we shall change our minds when we have 
glimpsed the possibility of desiring, choosing, and pursuing the 
good as he conceives it.9 
9This latter approach is predominant in an earlier article of Brandt's, 
"Moral Philosophy and the Analysis of Language," in Freedom and Morality, 
edited by John Bricke (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 
1976), pp. 1-22. 
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These two approaches to the defense of linguistic reform are not 
necessarily incompatible. Often there is no clear distinction be- 
tween changing our goals and merely rearticulating them.10 In ei- 
ther case, Brandt has to persuade us that judgments about the 
good as he conceives it are the judgments that we now want to live 
by, whether or not they are what we have wanted to live by all 
along. And in this Brandt fails, in my opinion, and was destined to 
fail, for philosophically interesting reasons. 
WHAT GETS LOST IN BRANDT'S TRANSLATION 
Brandt implies that his definition of "good" diverges from the 
ordinary sense of the term only to the extent of omitting its un- 
clear or unintelligible elements. He thus invites us to believe that 
all we have to lose by adopting his definition of "good" are ele- 
ments of meaning that we shall be glad to have lost. 
Unfortunately, Brandt never identifies the elements of meaning 
that we shall lose, nor does he explain why he finds them unclear 
or unintelligible. We are of course attracted by the prospect of 
lightening our conceptual load, by jettisoning bits of nonsense and 
confusion. Yet the bits to be jettisoned are, in reality, particular 
thoughts and particular questions that can be framed in our old 
vocabulary but not in Brandt's new one. And Brandt doesn't give 
us an opportunity to identify them or assess their value before he 
throws them overboard. In effect, he wants to be given the run of 
the cargo hold, in the name of conceptual streamlining, with no 
questions asked. 
I shall begin my critique of Brandt by identifying some of the 
thoughts and questions that his definition of "good" would pre- 
vent us from expressing. I shall then attack Brandt's grounds for 
thinking that these thoughts and questions are less worthy than the 
ones that his definition would enable us to express. My thesis is 
that Brandt has no defensible reason for preferring the elements 
o-c meaning that he preserves to the ones that he discards. 
What's lost. Brandt's definitional reforms would prevent us from 
justifying any changes in our desires other than the changes that 
10This point is made by Charles Taylor in "Responsibility for Self," The 
Identities of Persons, edited by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley, Calif.: 
U Diversity of California Press, 1976), pp. 294ff. 
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would be wrought by cognitive psychotherapy. For in Brandt's ter- 
minology, what's good, and hence worth wanting, is-by defini- 
tion-whatever we would want after cognitive psychotherapy. 
Among the things we actually want, the only things that aren't 
worth wanting, in Brandt's sense of the phrase, are the things that 
cognitive psychotherapy would stop us from wanting; and among 
the things we don't already want, the only things that are worth 
wanting, in Brandt's sense, are the things that cognitive psycho- 
therapy would cause us to want. Hence the only changes in our 
desires that can be justified in Brandt's language are the changes 
that would occur if we exposed ourselves to vivid representations 
of the facts.11 
Yet cognitive psychotherapy is not the only kind of motivational 
therapy there is. We can alter our desires, not only by exposing 
ourselves to the facts, but also by exposing ourselves to other kinds 
of influence-to the influence of other people, of literature, of 
prayer, or of our own self-censure and self-praise. And the possi- 
bility of such motivational therapy is often the theme of our evalu- 
ative discourse. When we ask what to desire, we're often asking, in 
effect, which persons to emulate, which regimen of self-discipline 
to undertake, or which influences to succumb to.12 Our reason for 
considering these noncognitive means of self-reform is not that we 
think of them as shortcuts to the same motivational state that 
would be produced by cognitive therapy. On the contrary, what 
commends these therapies to us is precisely that each of them 
holds out the promise of leaving an inimitable imprint on our mo- 
tives. Thus we are often willing to consider motivational changes 
even though they strike us as feasible only through noncognitive 
means. 
In Brandt's language, however, motivational changes that could 
be achieved only by noncognitive means are, by definition, 
"To be more precise, they are the changes that would occur if we ex- 
posed ourselves to vivid representations of the available relevant facts. 
Henceforth I shall omit these qualifying terms, since they have no bearing 
on my arguments. 
'2Brandt explicitly distinguishes cognitive psychotherapy from some of 
these alternatives. He says that cognitive psychotherapy "relies simply 
upon reflection on available information, without influence by prestige of 
someone, use of evaluative language, extrinsic reward or punishment, or 
use of artificially induced feeling-states like relaxation" (p. 113). 
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changes for the worse, insofar as they would leave us wanting 
things other than what we would want after purely cognitive 
therapy. Brandt's language is therefore fundamentally prejudiced 
against many familiar kinds of motivational change, in favor of the 
motivational status quo. 
This prejudice is especially stark in light of the possibility that 
some noncognitive forms of therapy might work changes that cog- 
nitive therapy not only couldn't work but also couldn't undo. Some 
desires that we are not currently disposed to acquire from con- 
fronting the facts may, once acquired by other means, be able to 
withstand such a confrontation. Training in "est," for instance, 
might instill ambitions that wouldn't be instilled by information 
alone but, once instilled, wouldn't be dispelled by information, ei- 
ther. What is the difference between these potentially new ambi- 
tions and the old ambitions that we wouldn't lose through cogni- 
tive psychotherapy alone? The difference is not that those old am- 
bitions are resistant to the facts, since the new ones would be, too, 
if we acquired them. The difference is merely that we already have 
the old ambitions but not the new ones. Indeed, the new ambitions 
would be rational, in Brandt's sense of the term, if only we already 
had them; but since we don't have them, and cannot acquire them 
merely by facing facts, Brandt would call them irrational. 
Conversely, some of our current desires that wouldn't be re- 
moved by information might not be restored by it, either, if re- 
moved by other means. Daily meditation, for instance, may banish 
desires that the facts would never have banished but are equally 
unable to reinstate. These desires aren't incompatible with the 
facts, given that we have them; but neither would their absence be, 
if we didn't. Why, then, should we have them? Brandt's only an- 
swer is that we should have them because we do have them and 
couldn't get rid of them through exclusively cognitive means.13 
'3Paul Boghossian has pointed out to me that Brandt might draw a 
somewhat different conclusion about the desires that I have discussed in 
these two paragraphs. Brandt might say that the objects of these desires 
are good for us if we want them but not if we don't want them, the upshot 
being that we cannot go wrong whether we want them or not. This con- 
clusion would still foreclose the question that we want to ask-namely, 
whether the objects are worth wanting-but it would foreclose this ques- 
tion in a slightly different way, by depriving the question of any answer 
rather than by forcing a particular answer upon it. The desires in question 
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Thus Brandt would prevent us from asking whether the things 
that we currently want are less worthy than things that we could 
learn to want only by practicing such noncognitive forms of 
therapy as est or meditation. Such a question would make no sense 
when expressed in Brandt's terminology, since in Brandt's terms, 
the latter objects are, by definition, not worth wanting. 
Brandt's language wouldn't do justice to our question even if we 
rephrased it so as to ask-not what's good, and hence worth 
wanting-but which desires are good, and hence worth having. 
Brandt would translate the question "Which desires are good?" 
into the question "Which desires are rational to desire?" and he 
would take the latter question to mean, "Which desires would we 
want after cognitive psychotherapy?" Yet when we wonder 
whether to change our desires, we aren't just asking whether we 
would want to change them after our present desires had been 
exposed to the facts. 
Of course, we wouldn't consider changing our present desires 
unless we had some present desire to change them; but the ques- 
tion whether to reform our desires is not simply a question about 
the validity of our present desire for self-reform, since that desire 
may itself be one whose reform is in question. Our efforts at 
would become by definition immune from criticism rather than by defini- 
tion correct or incorrect. 
Of course, there are desires about which we are willing to say that we 
cannot go wrong whether we have them or not-for instance, my desire 
to have soup for today's lunch. Brandt might wish to argue that these 
desires are the only ones that would be such as to withstand information, if 
we have them, but not be implanted by it, if we don't. In that case, the only 
desires that his theory exempted from criticism would be ones that we do 
not care to criticize anyway. 
One problem here is that a desire's sensitivity to information depends 
on how it is anchored in our psychology, whereas our interest in criticizing 
the desire depends largely on its content. It therefore seems unlikely that 
the desires rendered uncriticizable by Brandt's definition would be pre- 
cisely the ones that we have no interest in criticizing. A more fundamental 
problem is that we do not regard our license to criticize a desire as de- 
pending on whether the presence or absence of the desire would be re- 
versed by information. That's the point of fny argument, above, to the 
effect that we sometimes take seriously the question whether we ought to 
pursue motivational reforms that would require noncognitive therapy. 
The fact that information alone would leave us as we are in respect to 
some desire neither settles nor rules out the question whether we ought to 
have it. 
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changing our motives are often aimed at changing, among other 
things, our motives for those very efforts; for often the person we 
want to be would have different motives from ours for wanting to 
be the person he is. Hence even if our preference for his person- 
ality wouldn't withstand cognitive psychotherapy, his might, and 
his is the one we prefer. Surely, then, in wondering whether to 
become a different person, we aren't asking ourselves whether the 
person we are, if well informed, would still want to be different. 
Finally, Brandt's language also contains a bias in favor of our 
current traits of character, which partly determine how informa- 
tion affects us. For example, we may be especially fickle or stead- 
fast in our preferences, and hence especially susceptible or resis- 
tant to the motivational force of the facts. Furthermore, the same 
facts may exert different motivational forces on personalities of 
different kinds. Images of alien cultures may rouse us to wonder- 
ment if we're cosmopolitan, whereas if we're provincial, the same 
images may arouse contempt; the thought of a storm at sea may 
thrill us if we're brave but sicken us if we're timid; and our hearts 
may grow either hard or tender at the sight of other people's pain. 
Surely these different traits of character would dispose us to ac- 
quire different desires in response to the facts. Yet according to 
Brandt, the desires that we are currently disposed to acquire in 
response to information are, by definition, rational desires for us 
to have. Brandt's language therefore leaves us no means of ques- 
tioning our current dispositions for responding to information. 
Again, Brandt can ask whether information would make us want 
to alter our dispositions for responding to information; but what 
information would make us want is already dependent on our cur- 
rent dispositions for responding to it; and we needn't take these 
dispositions for granted, as Brandt's theory would do. In asking 
whether it would be good to be less fickle than we are, for instance, 
we needn't be asking whether the facts would cause a fickle person 
like ourselves to undergo a change of heart about being fickle. In 
asking whether it would be good to be softer of heart, we needn't 
be asking whether the facts would soften us, given how hard- 
hearted we are. 
An illustration. Let me illustrate these remarks by elaborating on 
Brandt's example of the Harvard professor who's weighing the 
merits of a job offer from Los Angeles. Brandt imagines that the 
professor's reservations about accepting the offer may arise from a 
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desire that wouldn't withstand confrontation with the facts. 
Perhaps the professor is appalled at the thought of leaving Har- 
vard because he wants to win the approval of his parents, who 
think that he should be loyal to the family alma mater; and perhaps 
his desire to win his parents' approval would diminish if only he 
wasn't continually visited by disproportionately vivid images of 
their beaming or scowling faces. In that case, his reservations 
about the new offer-as they stand-are irrational, according to 
Brandt's definition. 
Yet the professor's deliberations are unlikely to hang simply on 
how the facts would affect his present motives. In wondering 
whether leaving Harvard would be a good thing, the professor 
may be asking far more than whether factual information would 
make it attractive to him as he is now. He may be asking, instead, 
whether to be different-more loyal, perhaps, more ambitious, or 
more adventurous. He may be wondering whom to emulate 
among his teachers and senior colleagues: the globe-trotters or the 
sticks-in-the-mud? Indeed, he may be wondering whether he 
shouldn't cultivate a more mature, more realistic motive for defer- 
ring to his parents' wishes. Knowing that his current motive for 
pleasing his parents is the figment of an infantile imagination 
won't necessarily settle the question whether wanting to please 
them is a good thing. For he may still wonder whether his childish 
need for parental approval shouldn't have given way by now to an 
adult sense of filial devotion. 
None of these questions can be answered by identifying which 
desires would be rational, in Brandt's sense. The professor isn't 
asking himself, for example, whether new motives for pleasing his 
parents would result from a confrontation with the facts. He may 
know that cognitive psychotherapy would dissolve his current, im- 
mature dependence on his parents without precipitating a new, 
mature concern for them-and hence that it would remove but 
not replace his current motive for considering their wishes. He 
may know that the only way for him to cultivate a selfless concern 
for his parents would be, not to irradiate himself with facts, but to 
emulate the example of his older brother. But he still may not 
know the answer to his question. After all, the fact that exposure to 
information wouldn't make him more considerate of his parents 
may be, not an indication that he shouldn't be more considerate of 
them, but rather an indictment of the sort of person he is. Perhaps 
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the older brother would be drawn closer to his parents, not alien- 
ated from them, by an awareness of the facts. If the professor 
could only be more like his brother, he too could have filial mo- 
tives that the facts would reinforce rather than undermine. 
Wouldn't it be a good thing if he cultivated those motives? 
Brandt's definitions would prevent the professor from asking this 
question, rather than help him to answer it. 
Finally, the professor cannot answer his question by ascertaining 
whether he'd still want to cultivate different motives if he under- 
went cognitive psychotherapy. Of course, he must have some mo- 
tive for considering self-reform, but that motive may in fact be one 
whose reform is being considered. The professor's only motive for 
cultivating a selfless concern for his parents may be the self- 
centered thought that mommy and daddy won't love him any 
more if he doesn't. No doubt, this thought would lose some of its 
motivational force if he viewed his parents more realistically. But 
the thought of losing his parents' affection has moved him to con- 
sider whether to cultivate a genuinely selfless concern for them. It 
has thus moved him to consider replacing such self-centered 
thoughts as motives for having that very concern. Why should he 
care whether his current motive for becoming more selfless would 
survive exposure to the facts? He's thinking of acquiring a disposi- 
tion that would constitute a different motive for valuing self less- 
ness-namely, a genuine concern for others. Hence the professor 
does not mean to gauge the value of motivational change by the 
validity of his current motive for it; whereas Brandt's language 
would put no other standard at his disposal. Brandt's language 
would therefore force the professor to ask a different question 
from the one he wants to ask. 
In sum, the professor wants to assess, not only his actual motives 
for wanting to stay at Harvard, but also other motives that he 
could develop by various familiar, noncognitive means. Brandt's 
definition of "good" would block this line of inquiry. His definition 
therefore eliminates from our ordinary sense of "good," not just 
confusions and irrelevancies, but also perfectly serviceable aspects 
of meaning. 
What's left. There are, of course, some practical questions that 
Brandt can answer in his vocabulary, and he tries to arouse our 
interest in them; but he never manages to dampen our interest in 
the other questions, which he cannot pose. For example, Brandt 
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points out that "people-including the reader-do dislike having 
to think that their desires are irrational in my sense," because of 
the dissonance between such desires and reality (p. 157). Now, if 
we were wondering merely whether to have well-informed or ill- 
informed desires, Brandt's point about our aversion to cognitive 
dissonance might put our question to rest. But what we want to ask 
is, not whether to have well- or ill-informed desires, but which set 
of well-informed desires to have. And as I have argued, the possi- 
bility of noncognitive therapy puts many alternative sets of well- 
informed desires within our reach. There are the well-informed 
desires that we would have if exposed to information as we are 
now; and then there are the well-informed desires that informa- 
tion would induce in us if we underwent some other form of 
therapy first. All of these desires are on a par as far as consonance 
with reality is concerned, and so Brandt's point about cognitive 
dissonance cannot justify his choice of one set over the others 
Thus, the Harvard professor, as I have described him, is not 
undecided between his current, unrealistic dependence on his 
parents and the more realistic indifference that he'd feel after cog- 
nitive psychotherapy. Rather, he's undecided between the indif- 
ference that he's now disposed to feel after cognitive psycho- 
therapy and an equally realistic concern that he would feel after 
cognitive psychotherapy if only he were more like his brother. 
Hence the professor's aversion to having ill-informed desires is no 
reason for him to confine his attention to the desires that would be 
produced in him by information alone. He can acquire many well- 
informed desires other than the ones that would result if he ac- 
quired nothing but information. Unfortunately, the question 
whether to cultivate such desires cannot be accurately translated 
into Brandt's vocabulary. 
Brandt also argues that rational desires, in his sense of the term, 
are the most conducive to our happiness. Ill-informed desires, as 
he points out, are often for the attainment of things that we won't 
in fact enjoy or for the avoidance of things that we would enjoy, or 
at least wouldn't dislike (pp. 153-154). Acting on well-informed 
desires is therefore a more efficient means of accumulating enjoy- 
ments. And since we want enjoyment, Brandt argues, we should 
want to know which desires we would have if we were well- 
informed. 
But again, our desire for enjoyment is no reason to confine our 
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attention to the potential products of cognitive psychotherapy. 
The reason why we can cultivate new desires, in many cases, is that 
we can cultivate new tastes, which dispose us to enjoy different 
things, and which therefore produce different desires in the light 
of full information. The question we ask when wondering whether 
to alter our desires may therefore be, not what we'd want if we 
knew what would make us happy as we are now, but whether to 
change what would make us happy. The desires that would result 
from such a change would be different from the ones that cogni- 
tive psychotherapy would produce by itself; and so they are dif- 
ferent from the desires that Brandt would call rational. But they 
would be no less conducive to our happiness, given our altered 
tastes, than Brandt's rational desires would be, given the tastes we 
have now. 
ARE BRANDT'S QUESTIONS CLEAR? 
Hence Brandt's stated reasons for preferring his evaluative 
questions fail to persuade us. However, I suspect that the ultimate 
reason for his preference is one that he never fully expounds as 
such. 
When Brandt first sets out to redefine evaluative language, he 
announces that his goal is to arrive at questions that can be settled 
empirically. He aims "to answer the traditional questions about the 
good and the right . . . [by] rephras[ing] these questions in termi- 
nology sufficiently clear and precise for one to answer them by 
some mode of scientific or observational procedure, or at least by 
some clearly stateable and familiar mode of reasoning" (p. 2). And 
he promises: 
We shall see [that] clear questions emerge, as the ones we want to 
answer for purposes of action. Once we know what these are, we can 
use the ordinary methods of science and observation to determine the 
answers (p. 22). 
Now, Brandt doesn't explicitly present the empirical nature of 
the resulting questions as a reason for preferring them to their 
ordinary-language counterparts. Rather, he tends to suggest that 
his questions are the ones that we do or should want to ask in any 
case, and that their susceptibility to empirical methods, though a 
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welcome feature, is not to be our reason for adopting them. Yet 
Brandt does defend his linguistic reforms as preserving "all that is 
clear" or "identifiable" in our ordinary questions; and the passages 
just quoted indicate that clarity is closely associated in Brandt's 
mind with empirical determinability. Hence the suspicion remains 
that what distinguishes the questions that Brandt wishes to pre- 
serve from those which he is content to discard is that the former 
are clearer precisely in the sense of being empirical. Perhaps, then, 
Brandt's underlying reason for wanting to ask what a person 
would desire after exposure to the facts, rather than what's good 
in the ordinary sense of the term, is that the former question 
strikes him as the only one that's sufficiently clear and precise to be 
answered by the methods of science and observation. 
Unfortunately, Brandt is mistaken about the clarity of his own 
question. To ask what a person would want after exposure to the 
facts is not to ask a determinate question at all, and hence not to 
ask a question that empirical tests could settle. And as I shall 
argue, any attempt to sharpen this question robs it of any interest 
it may have held for us in the first place. 
The problem of representation. The problem here is that "exposure 
to the facts," in the context of Brandt's theory, has no determinate 
meaning. For in Brandt's theory, the phrase refers to a regimen of 
mental representation; and the same facts can be represented in 
many different ways, with different motivational consequences. 
Suppose, for example, that I suffer from heart disease so ad- 
vanced that my only chance for survival lies in receiving a heart 
transplant. And suppose that I would be inclined to go through 
with a transplant if only I weren't appalled by the thought of 
having another person's heart lodged in my chest. According to 
Brandt, I ought to wonder whether my aversion to a transplant is 
rational; and whether it's rational depends on whether it would 
survive exposure to the facts. What exactly would constitute such 
exposure? 
To begin with, the facts in question would have to be repre- 
sented in a particular medium, and there is more than one me- 
dium available. I can state the facts, I can picture them, I can dia- 
gram or map them, and their motivational impact may well de- 
pend on their medium of representation. Surely mental pictures 
of open-heart surgery would affect me differently from a mental 
flow chart or narration. Furthermore, each medium of represen- 
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tation affords me considerable latitude in style and perspective. 
For instance, I can describe the operation in medical jargon, using 
words like "incision," "suture," "clot," and "hemorrhage"; or I can 
describe it in layman's terms with words like "slice," ''sew," ''gob," 
and "gush." If I choose instead to picture the operation, I can pic- 
ture platelets and leucocytes rushing to the scene of damaged 
tissue; or a seething chest cavity laid bare by steel instruments; or 
an operating table surrounded by machines and gowned figures; 
or perhaps even a quiet Midwest town in which there stands a 
gleaming hospital, whose operating theater is bustling with activity 
one dark winter morning. 
Each of these representations would exert a different motiva- 
tional impact from the others. The clinical description of a heart- 
transplant operation would probably be reassuringly scientific; the 
layman's description would be disgustingly graphic. A microscopic 
view of the operation would be violent; the telescopic view may be 
downright placid. Just consider the difference in motivational im- 
pact between calling the operation a cardio-transplant and calling 
it a heart-swap. 
To ask simply about the motivational impact of the facts, then, is 
not to ask a determinate question. There is no single motivational 
impact associated with the facts in themselves. The facts would 
exert various impacts, when presented in various media, perspec- 
tives, and vocabularies. Consequently, I cannot resolve my prac- 
tical dilemma by asking what I would want after exposure to the 
facts, since the only accurate answer to that question is, "It would 
depend on how I looked at them." 
The only way of eliminating this problem would be by resorting 
to an unacceptably naive form of realism. The necessity of de- 
ciding how to represent the facts in cognitive psychotherapy 
wouldn't trouble us if we thought that one medium or style of rep- 
resentation were favored by the facts themselves-that the facts 
were such as can be accurately conveyed only in pictures, or only in 
a particular vocabulary. But this form of realism would require 
that the test of correspondence to reality differentiate, not only 
between incompatible representations, but also between seemingly 
compatible ones. It would require that the world be in itself pic- 
torial or verbal, technical or slangy, close up or far off, so as to 
distinguish the one true representation from the false ones. Surely 
no realist would really be so naive. 
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Coping with the problem. Although Brandt cannot eliminate this 
problem, he might at least attempt to cope with it. For he could 
easily specify a particular medium, perspective, or vocabulary as 
the one to be used in cognitive psychotherapy. To ask what was 
good in Brandt's sense would then be to ask what one would want 
after exposure to a particular representation of the facts-a ques- 
tion to which there would be a determinate answer that might be 
ascertained, at least in principle, by the methods of empirical psy- 
chology. 
Yet if Brandt clarified his definition of "good" in this fashion, he 
would thereby make the definition even harder to defend. For he 
would incorporate into the meaning of "good," not only a preju- 
dice against motivational reforms that would require noncognitive 
modes of therapy, but also a prejudice against reforms that would 
require nothing more than exposure to alternative representations 
of the facts. In the course of deliberation we frequently ask our- 
selves-not only whether we should try to emulate others, 
whether we should pray for guidance, and so forth-but also 
whether we ought to look at matters from one perspective or an- 
other. And this latter question would be ruled out by Brandt's clari- 
fied definition, since one way of viewing the facts would be de- 
fined as yielding correct desires, and all other representations 
would be defined as yielding incorrect desires, insofar as they 
yielded different desires at all. Brandt's clarified definition would 
therefore entail a commitment to living by the motivational influ- 
ence of a particular point of view; and he would have to explain 
why we should accept that commitment. 
In fact, Brandt's definition may already contain a clarification of 
the sort that I have in mind, since he says that the representation 
to which the patient should expose himself in cognitive psycho- 
therapy is the one that's "ideally vivid" (pp. 111-112). Perhaps 
Brandt believes that his requirement of ideal vividness narrows 
down the representational possibilities to a single one.14 I doubt, 
however, whether this requirement distinguishes among different 
modes of representation at all. Is a vivid picture more vivid than a 
vivid description? Surely, the difference between such alternative 
representations is a difference in kind of vividness, not in degree: 
'4Professor Brandt has told me that, being an empiricist at heart, he 
regards sensory images as the most vivid mode of representation. 
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the one is vivid visually, the other verbally, and neither is more 
vivid purely and simply. 
Even if the requirement of ideal vividness did select for a single 
mode of representation, Brandt would be unable to justify that 
selection. He might have been able to justify it if (as he may be- 
lieve) the most vivid representation of a fact had a motivational 
impact that differed only in degree from that of its less vivid alter- 
natives. In that case, to represent a fact most vividly would be to let 
it exert fully the same motivational impact that it would exert only 
partially if represented differently. There would be a single moti- 
vational effect attributable to the facts, and fully confronting the 
facts would require undergoing that effect to the fullest extent, 
which would in turn require confronting the most vivid represen- 
tation. But as we have seen, alternative representations have moti- 
vational effects that differ in kind and not merely in degree. How 
can Brandt suggest that one of these effects is privileged simply 
because it is the strongest? 
All the angles? One might think that Brandt could avoid having to 
choose among the various ways of representing the facts in cogni- 
tive psychotherapy simply by stipulating that they are to be repre- 
sented every which way. Perhaps rational desires should be de- 
fined as the desires that we would have, not just after exposure to 
all of the facts, but after exposure to all of the facts from all angles 
and in all lights.15 This revised definition of rational desire would 
15J owe this suggestion to Peter Railton. Railton has written about the 
problem of representation in his "Facts and Values," pp. 19-25, partly in 
response to an earlier draft of the present paper. However, Railton ad- 
dresses a somewhat different version of the problem from the one that I 
raise here. Railton asks whether the possibility of alternative representa- 
tions renders questions of goodness indeterminate; whereas I am asking 
whether it renders them empirically indeterminable. (Railton's discussion also 
differs from mine, of course, in that it concerns his own definition of 
"good," which differs from Brandt's in crucial respects.) 
I happen to think that questions of goodness, as defined by Brandt or 
Railton, turn out to be indeterminate as well as indeterminable, but not 
because of the possibility of alternative representations. The questions are 
indeterminate because they hang on counterfactuals about what someone 
would want if he knew everything, and there is no unique way of evaluat- 
ing such counterfactuals. Since a person isn't actually capable of knowing 
everything, his knowing everything would require significant alterations 
in his actual psychological makeup; and there may be many different al- 
terations that would do the trick. Consequently, there may be many dif- 
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have an appeal of its own, quite apart from its apparent utility as a 
solution to the problem of representation. After all, saying that a 
person has looked at an issue from every angle is a common way of 
saying that he has deliberated about it well. 
But when we say that someone has looked at an issue from every 
angle, we aren't speaking literally. We don't mean that he has rep- 
resented the issue to himself in every medium of representation, 
from every perspective. Rather, we mean that he has canvassed 
those particular angles which we consider illuminating for the 
issue at hand-always at least two, of course, but rarely more than 
three or four. The problem for Brandt is that there are not three 
or four standard angles from which we think that every issue 
should be viewed; and so there is no standard regimen of reflec- 
tion that we would be willing to enshrine in our definition of 
"good." Each issue, or kind of issue, obliges us to experiment with 
a different selection of representational possibilities. Indeed, some 
issues oblige us to invent new representational possibilities-new 
vocabularies, new graphic conventions, new methods of projection 
-in order to review them to our satisfaction. 
Thus, if Brandt wanted to prescribe what we ordinarily mean by 
considering an issue from all angles, he would have to define the 
good as that which one would want after representing the facts in 
whichever ways were most illuminating for the issue at hand. And 
then his definition would no longer yield empirical questions 
that is, unless Brandt knows of some empirical test that detects 
illuminating representations, which I doubt. 
Alternatively, Brandt could prescribe exposure to the facts rep- 
resented, literally, in every possible way. But he would not thereby 
improve the clarity of his definition, since the phrase "all possible 
representations" is not empirically determinate, either. The 
problem is not just that this phrase encompasses more actual lan- 
guages and graphic conventions than we are capable of testing in 
practice. The problem is that, in order to yield a satisfactory defi- 
nition of "good," the phrase would have to encompass every pos- 
sible language and every possible graphic convention-every 
mode of representation that we might ever invent in order to illu- 
ferent possible states of affairs satisfying the antecedent "if he knew every- 
thing . . ." yielding different truth-values for the counterfactuals in ques- 
tion. Compare: "If you were a pig, you'd like mud." (Here again, I am 
indebted to Paul Boghossian.) 
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minate an issue. And there is no scientific method for generating a 
catalog of possible future inventions. 
To say that I ought to reflect on the subject of heart surgery 
from every possible angle, literally speaking, would be to say some- 
thing that was hopelessly vague and open-ended. Suppose that I 
told myself the story of the proposed operation in the style of 
Homer, the style of Proust, the style of Hemingway, and the style 
of Gertrude Stein. Would I have exhausted all of the illuminating 
ways in which the story might be told? Could I exhaust all the 
illuminating ways of telling the story by telling it in the style of 
every author who ever lived? Surely, I'd have to tell it in the style 
of every possible author. And what, pray tell, is the scientific or 
observational method for ascertaining the impact of a possible au- 
thor? 
Just the facts? One might object that the descriptions likely to be 
written by poets or novelists would be too figurative and fanciful 
for cognitive psychotherapy, which is restricted to representing 
the facts. But this objection would merely draw attention to an- 
other respect in which Brandt's definition is unclear-namely, in 
its reference to factual representations. Even someone who is a 
thoroughgoing realist about the facts should hesitate before postu- 
lating a clear distinction between representations that are factual 
and representations that are figurative or fanciful. One can think 
that there is a particular way the world is, and that correspondence 
to the world is what makes a representation true, without also 
thinking that there is a clear distinction between representations 
that do nothing more than show how the world is and representa- 
tions that do other, less respectable things as well. Perhaps all rep- 
resentations tinge their subject matter with some extraneous color, 
because they must employ a verbal or visual or, in any case, sym- 
bolic medium, with purely fortuitous connotations, in representing 
what is in itself neither verbal nor visual nor in any way symbolic. 
If so, Brandt won't be able to give clear instructions for cognitive 
psychotherapy by saying "Just report the facts." He will have to say 
exactly how colorful the report is allowed to be. And then he will 
have to explain why we should define "good" as including objects 
that we'd want after exposure to a report that colorful but not ob- 
jects that we'd want only after exposure to a slightly more colorful 
report. 
Suppose that the beating heart laid bare in surgery looks like a 
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caught fish writhing on the deck of a boat. When I say so, if it is so, 
am I giving a factual report? Brandt could banish all similes from 
cognitive psychotherapy, of course; but then he'd have to explain 
why motivational effects peculiar to this very illuminating kind of 
representation should be defined as deleterious. And if Brandt 
allows some similes in cognitive psychotherapy, where is he going 
to draw the line? 
Brandt faces a dilemma, then. If he gives a clear and precise 
specification of how the facts are to be represented in cognitive 
psychotherapy, his definition of "good" will commit us to viewing 
every practical issue in particular ways, no matter how future 
issues, as yet unimagined, beg to be viewed. If he doesn't give a 
clear and precise specification of how the facts are to be repre- 
sented, however, his definition of "good" will not yield questions 
that can be settled, as he claims, by the methods of science and 
observation. 
CONCLUSION 
I see no reason to prefer Brandt's meaning of "good" to the 
ordinary sense of the term. What's good in Brandt's sense is not 
necessarily more conducive to our pleasure than what's good in the 
ordinary sense; desiring what's good in Brandt's sense need not be 
more consonant with reality than desiring what's good in the ordi- 
nary sense; and evaluative questions do not gain empirical clarity 
when translated from our ordinary vocabulary into Brandt's. Why, 
then, should we give up asking the many questions that cannot be 
asked in Brandt's vocabulary? 
I think that Brandt's definition of "good" begins with a sound 
intuition. The intuition is that something is wrong with a desire if 
it would be extinguished by information -that one shouldn't want 
anything that one wouldn't want if one knew more. But Brandt 
tries to make this modest intuition yield a moral theory, and in so 
doing he tortures it beyond recognition. First he turns the intui- 
tion on its head, so as to say, not that one shouldn't want what one 
wouldn't want if one knew more, but rather that one should want 
whatever one would want if only one knew more. And then he 
treats the notion of "knowing more" as if it were, not a vague and 
context-dependent ideal, but an effective procedure for gener- 
ating correct desires. 
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